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Introduction 
Economic analysis of telecom-related issues often takes an essentially static equilibrium perspective, 
using comparative statics or moment-to-moment sequences of equilibrium behaviour to model the 
development and impacts of technologies, economic behaviour and regulation. Of course, much if not 
all of these developments occur far from equilibrium; this paper argues for resurrecting a more 
evolutionary perspective – in particular by taking account of dynamic rigidities. 
The models involved are not new – in the economic literature their formal development dates back at 
least to the work of David (1974), Desi (1982) Winter (1982), Arthur (1984) and Farrell and Saloner 
(1985). Taken together, these articles demonstrated the possibility of lock-in (especially to a given 
technology or supplier) in the presence of complementarities. A related thread in the game-theoretic 
literature analyses the evolution and stability of conventions, generally in coordination games. 
The implications for positive analysis are fairly straightforward; change is likely to be discontinuous 
and path-dependent, and (evolutionary) equilibrium outcomes are not necessarily optimal. This has 
equally straightforward implications for policy analysis and development; governance and regulation 
are periodically subject to by intentional or accidental change. Often, the intent of those participating 
in the change is to initiate, influence or set the seal on technical, economic and/or regulatory 
developments. Their deliberations are often sophisticated, taking account of the optimal responses of 
other stakeholders – but in the presence of rigidities, these assumptions about freedom of choice may 
not hold; the ability to recognise and respond to challenges is strongly path-dependent. This is 
particularly true in relation to markets with network externalities, which – as Katz and Shapiro (1992, 
1994) observed - tend towards ‘tipping’ into monopoly and polarisation of responses to innovation 
between excess inertia (lock-in to incumbent technology) and excess volatility (rushing to the ‘next 
big thing’). These phenomena are not limited to specific interoperability concerns identified by early 
authors in the field.  
The logic applies to the self-stabilisation or persistence of technologies (and ‘technology clusters1’) 
business models (and populations of complimentary models); regulations (and regulatory approaches 
like incentive regulation or market-based regulation); and even the economic paradigms used for 
policy formulation2. Lock-in rigidities can arise from economic factors (as indicated below) but are 
often reinforced by the self-confirming nature of empirical evaluation; adoption of a technology, 
business model, regulation or economic theory often brings with it customary relationships, sources of 
evidence and evaluation frames which form a subset of a possibly much wider set.  
One area where these rigidities might be anticipated is “net neutrality.” Proponents of some forms of 
net neutrality regulation point to the danger that end-users and/or content suppliers may be locked into 
vertically-integrated “walled gardens” and that useful innovation and diversity may thereby be locked 
out. Conversely, opponents of such restrictions who are concerned lest blanket ‘equal treatment’ rules 
foreclose efficient forms of differentiation3 point out that common carriage ISP business models may 
not be able to recognise or respond to opportunities to produce welfare improvements by introducing 
efficient and explicit price- and/or quality-of-service differentiation. From the policy perspective, it is 
also interesting to note that the net neutrality debate itself has been framed differently in the US and in 
Europe. Partially, this reflects different regulatory environments and levels of local broadband 
competition; the interpretation of net neutrality proposals and evidence is in any case different in 
markets where open access to networks and transport services is guaranteed by dedicated parts of the 
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regulatory framework4 and where in consequence regulation against price discrimination on the basis 
of content may appear less relevant.  
Another area in which policy development shows evidence of internal rigidity is self-regulation. 
Lock-in arises from the capture of a regulatory area. The institutionalisation of self-regulatory bodies 
often leads them to become – or involve – the main source(s) of information about performance and 
compliance, and places such bodies beyond the effective scrutiny of independent auditors. As a result, 
it becomes difficult to know whether their performance is adequate and unlikely that their power will 
be clawed back (this is not specific to telecom self-regulation, of course). This applies to many 
specific areas; the intention here is not to criticise individual self-regulatory organisations but to point 
out their self-confirming nature. 
A further specific example can be drawn from spectrum allocation. The 2.6 GHz band is potentially 
useable by either symmetric, telephony-related technologies (e.g. LTE) or asymmetric, computing-
derived technologies WiMax. In addition to the ability to use the same spectral band, these 
technologies are each capable of various uses, though each technology is relatively better at some uses 
compared to the other. Currently, the symmetric technology is more mature. To reflect the symmetric 
technologies’ need for paired bands with a 120 MHz separation, auctions to date have tended to 
allocate spectrum separately according to fixed proportions. This can obviously affect the 
development of the market, as the initial lead technology is likely to build a sustainable advantage 
independent of technical superiority. This is reinforced by differences in access cost; the Swedish and 
Norwegian auctions, for instance, produced very different relative prices for the two types of licence. 
Other auctions, such as the package auction format planned for use in the UK, endogenise the 
allocation of spectrum – this auction has been delayed by lawsuits initiated by proponents of the 
symmetric technology. The potential for inefficient lock-in has been recognised, and can be mitigated 
(at least in theory) by spectrum trading; the idea is that a superior technology can gain access – when 
it is ready – by outbidding inferior technologies. To date, however, this remains a theoretical 
possibility. To see one reason why, suppose that an auction for dual-capable spectrum was being 
contested between two technologies of differing maturities and overlapping capability. Based on 
present discounted value alone, the more mature technology is likely to win; if this discourages entry 
by the other technology, the cost advantage of the current leader becomes even greater. If spectrum 
trading is a viable prospect, the proponent of the less-mature technology faces a choice between 
bidding (and losing) in the present auction, with the prospect of increasing the price paid by the 
mature technology; bidding (and winning) the present auction, with the prospect of large debts 
compared with a delayed income stream; or waiting for subsequent spectrum markets to secure the 
needed spectrum. Owners of the mature technology can bid for spectrum on the basis of its current 
value, but may also be motivated by the prospect of either cornering the spectrum market in advance 
(in case the less mature technology turns out to be dominant) or prolonging market control (by 
restricting supply to spectrum markets). Given this range of possibilities, there is no obvious reason to 
suppose that an auction held today will produce an efficient allocation of spectrum in the long run, 
even before accounting for the impact of strategic bidding on the availability of investment finance for 
the new technology or the possibility that the current winner may lock-in the installed base of users. 
Rigidities 
Lock-in can arise from reinforcement in a specific domain, e.g. technology (widespread adoption of a 
technological paradigm); market forces (natural monopoly, tipping, incomplete information); or 
policy (subsidies for particular technologies, large (innovative) public procurement, adoption of a 
non-neutral regulatory paradigm). It can be made stronger by interaction among technical, economic, 
regulatory, etc. domains. This may be inefficient; equilibrium may not exist, involve adoption of an 
inefficient standard or fail to attain efficient standardisation. Intervention (more generally, interaction 
with another domain) may make matters worse. For example, public authorities can back technologies 
that are inefficient or that are efficient but incapable of attaining sustainable dominance, or they may 
champion competing standards) – sometimes as a result of capture or over-reliance legacy models and 
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approaches (e.g. endorsing a regulated natural monopoly approach even when new technologies make 
competition viable).  
Evolutionary alternatives to static neoclassical models make it easier to model the behaviour of 
trajectories disturbed by shocks arising in one domain (e.g. a new technology, business model or 
policy and their interactions with other domains. The perturbations may be transitory or lasting in 
their ‘native’ context; where persistence involves diffusion or further exploitation, the resulting 
dynamics are likely to be ‘punctuated5’ with specific windows of opportunity for intervention. 
Business is certainly alive to the opportunities thus provided, as evidenced by the emergence of new 
business models based on indirect exploitation of free services6. 
Lock-in can discourage, delay or prevent technological, economic or regulatory innovation, including 
incremental invention (e.g. new technology generations) or transition to superior existing alternatives. 
At the same time, actual or potential lock-in may underwrite beneficial complementary investment. 
The systemic impact arises from the struggle over interoperation and compatibility; firms are likely to 
exploit captive markets by raising prices to locked-in consumers to the height of switching costs – this 
can lead them to compete extensively by investing in incompatibility. Conversely, firms solicit new 
customers by competing intensively with discounts and complimentary products. Extensive 
competition tends initially to be unstable and sensitive to competing offers, new technologies 
elsewhere in value chains, etc. - but is in the long run liable to “tip" into rigid monopoly and to 
sacrifice both the immediate benefits of interoperability and the ‘generative’ further innovation to 
which open interaction gives rise. By contrast, intensive competition raises switching costs and thus 
encourages small-scale entry, but equally discourages raids on rivals’ installed base, deterring 
aggressive entry even by modestly superior technologies.  
From a policy perspective, this argument leads to a perspective that considers extended value chains 
(e.g. not just telecommunications but the entire complex system of ICT-enabled economic activity; 
even when regulatory traction is limited to a few large telecom providers, the assessment of regulation 
should take into account impacts occurring up- and downstream and the prospects for new structures. 
These are not limited to market outcomes; as discussed below, technological, economic and 
regulatory compatibility affect connectivity as well. The specific concern is that even inefficient 
extensive competition – in a single domain - is likely to dominate intensive competition, especially for 
incumbents, resulting in too little connectivity or compatibility. 
Formation of technology trends 
The literature remains divided about the extent to which specific technology trends are defined and 
integrated into national, sectoral, etc. systems of innovation but there is no doubt that technological 
development as a whole is a systemic property7. There are, however, distinct perspectives on the 
'system' involved. In much of neoclassical economics (including some endogenous growth theories), 
technologies arise as either exogenous shocks or more or less predictable consequences of past 
investments whose implications have been taken into account or at least foreseen. 
Evolutionary economics8 recognises that technologies may produce lock-in either as described above 
or through interactions with market demand9 or regulation. These rigidities10 arise from the combined 
evolutionary forces of variation (innovation, under the assumption that ‘small’ and compatible 
innovations are more likely than large), selection (by peer review, R&D funders and complementary 
innovators) market forces and/or regulatory protection) and heredity (e.g. technology clustering, IPR 
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sharing,). This may be inefficient11. But not all possible technology trends will stabilise in this way – 
that generally requires positive reinforcement by selection in other domains (e.g. novel market or end-
user applications, formation of new market segments, market segmentation and the adaptive 
expectations of financiers, customers and policy-makers). Such reinforcements make trend 
continuation more likely; they also imply that policy choices (e.g. adopting a particular technology for 
public service delivery, supporting research in certain areas, changing laws and regulations to 
accommodate new technologies, etc.) need to take into account the potential that policy itself may 
induce lock-in and conversely that negative reinforcement can upset the stability of technologies12.  
The picture becomes more interesting when related technologies develop together. Mutual 
reinforcement can discourage or even prevent new developments. For example, network externalities 
among previous adopters of one or more related technologies may render a new and improved 
generation irrelevant to the market, but a third selection mechanism (e.g. strategic public procurement 
of an incompatible technology selected on the basis of what is feasible (supply) and desirable 
(demand)13 may produce to the kind of ‘break-out’ described by Arthur (1988). 
The key point is that selection can occur in many contexts (e.g. technology, economics and politics). 
Their mutual reinforcement (see Figure 1) can lead to persistence of arrangements that are: 
• inefficient overall (either in a static sense or because they discourage further innovations); 
• inefficient in context (alternative technologies, markets or policies are not realised); and/or 
• prone to disruption by developments arising in another sphere (break-out). 
Other obvious points are: 
• the possibility of lock-in distorts technical, economic and political incentives; 
• lock-in affects cluster or paradigm formation – for instance, by changing innovation trajectories to 
suppress continual small innovations and raising the odds of large, infrequent and disruptive 
innovations; and  
• market and social changes are more likely to be abrupt, discontinuous and/or cyclical. 
 




Lock-in to technical 
market paradigm 







Figure 1: cross-domain lock-in 
Thus lock-in and breakout can occur as a result of system dynamics rather than individual decision. 
Lock-in in the Arthur model 
Arthur (1988) considers lock-in as a result of two interacting governance mechanisms. Two types of 
user (α and β) have different preferences for two technologies (A and B; α prefers A and β prefers B). 
Preferences are also influenced by cohesion - the proportion (nA and nB) of users of each technology 
and the strength (νA and νB, resp.) of network effects with each – more users makes a technology 
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more attractive. In concrete terms, the users get the following benefits from different technology 
choices: 
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 network effects are 'strong enough' compared to user preferences.
 
If users choose in random order, the standard theory of Markov processes predicts the certainty of 
eventual lock-in. This is not easy to reverse, even if the network benefits of the losing (winning) 
technology strongly increase (fall).  Forcing break-out by adding a large number of users preferring 
the new technology or pushing network externalities to unrealistic extremes produces rapid lock-in to 
the other technology. Hence, development of a specific technology trend depends less on past 
developments than the evolutionary mechanism underlying substitution; similarly, breaking out of 
lock-in owes less to emergence of new and superior technologies than the relative weakness of market 
cohesion. Simulations show that new technologies may fail or displace old technologies, but are 
unlikely to reach a stable balance with an incumbent technology; in this simple two-domain 
(technical-market) view, a technology is more likely to accumulate associated technologies than to 
‘share the market.’ 
Of course, network effects can become negative e.g. if a technology exposes its users to risks arising 
from other users that outweigh the network gains. This ‘crowding out’ can destroy lock-in; in extreme 
cases it can force a kind of ‘negative’ competition in which no technology dominates14. 
The picture changes if three (or more) selection forces interact. Dolfsma and Leydesdorff15 (2009, 
forthcoming) show that this can lead to enhanced break-out and competition (diversity).  
Structural change 
These models do not consider the structure of adopter networks; in general the cohesion of users 
around a particular technology and the attractiveness of a core technology to additional innovations 
depend on the nature of other users and on their willingness to adopt supplementary technologies. For 
example, the evolution of (for instance) integrated office suites combining document preparation, 
                                                    
14
 The argument is essentially that of Tiebout (1956) 
15
 Dolfsma and  Leydesdorff (2009) 
spreadsheet computation and presentation applications reflects their adoption in a business 
environment; integrated suites that develop in other contexts (e.g. scientific communities) combine 
different applications or emphasise different functions16. 
Even the geometry of technology-supported interactions and learning alters the results. Consider a 
population in which new technologies arise and spread by ‘word of mouth’ – ultimately, superior 
technologies are likely to be adopted, so we focus here on inferior technologies. These technologies 
belong to a ‘cluster’ of essentially similar technologies, so that individuals can sample different 
versions. For concreteness, suppose that an individual will try the technology in a given moment with 
a probability proportional to a constant µ (the marketing effort or viral infectiousness of the 
technology) times the proportion of that individual’s network neighbours (influential contacts) 
currently using it. The probability that a user will discard the technology at a given moment is 
proportional to another constant ρ17. The ratio λ = µ/ρ is the effective spreading rate; each network 
structure has a characteristic threshold λ* above which the technology will permeate the network 
(before taking over or dying out). It is interesting to note that this threshold is effectively 0 for the 
scale-free networks often used to describe the Internet; this structure (dominated by a few highly-
connected individuals) is thus extremely open to the diffusion of (good or bad) innovations and 
responds reasonably well to interventions targeted at key hubs. Convergence favours the ‘risk-
dominant’ technology – not necessarily the best in terms of total performance, but (roughly) the one 
that is best in a world where one’s neighbours choose randomly18 or where the advantages of specific 
complementarities are matched by robustness to ‘alien technology.’ Convergence is much faster in 
networks with a high degree of local interaction or clustering. 
But it is hard to verify or adapt policy to patterns of interaction. In the first place, most interactions 
cannot be directly observed. In some cases (e.g. Walled Gardens, vertically integrated service 
provision or server-based peering systems) it may be possible to classify structures, but hard to 
evaluate their influence on individual technology choices. More importantly, structures are (at least in 
part) endogenous and variable. Suppose that adoption and connectivity are linked: people tend to 
replace links to neighbours using incompatible technologies with new links to people using the same 
system. This produces a range of interesting implications19. First, the distribution of connectivity 
changes; starting from a ‘scale-free’ distribution, for example, it becomes much ‘flatter’ with many 
more people at all levels of connectivity. Second, connectivity becomes more associative – firms or 
individuals have most of their links with others of similar connectivity – this undercuts the 
effectiveness of targeted interventions. For example, a direct attempt to inhibit adoption of a 
dangerous technology by highly-connected stakeholders will leave the less-connected majority 
relatively untouched; their adoption will in turn continuously re-infect the rest of the system. A third 
implication is endemic persistence; there is a second threshold above which even an inferior 
technology will not disappear from the system, but will remain as a legacy system for an extended 
period. Finally, the systems displays endogenous polarisation; over time, it will evolve two loosely-
connected components, with very different prevalence of the new (and by assumption inferior) 
technology. 
This analysis indicates that inefficient lock-in for technological or economic reasons can be 
minimised by ‘linking’ to a strategic policy selection mechanism, or merely by interconnection of 
domains with distinctly different user needs and/or technology bases. Second, clustering of 
complementary applications on the basis of aligned user interests and technological developments is 
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not simply a result of pre-existing clusters of supply or demand characteristics but is an endogenous 
result of the way people come together in shared use of technologies. Finally, technological and/or 
business regulation can affect the structures through which new technologies diffuse and thus the 
ability of the economy as a whole to induce and identify superior technologies and to exploit them is 
beneficial ways.  
Standards vs. variety 
The preceding discussion is based primarily on the Arthur model, where network effects are so strong 
as to make lock-in inevitable. A related model is the Farrell and Saloner20 (1996) analysis of standards 
vs. variety. The population is divided between users of types α and β on the basis of preference (as 
before, type α prefers technology A) in proportions a% and 1-a%. They are also divided in terms of 
technology adoption, with ni using technology i (for i = A, B). A type α user gets utility nA by 
adopting A and nB – d from adopting B (type β users get nA – d from A and nB from B). The outcome 
in this model depends on the ‘distaste’ d of each user for the ‘wrong’ technology. Each additional user 
of a specific technology increases the value of adopting it by 1, if d is less than one, either technology 
can take over the market. If d is bigger than one, no single technology can prevail. If both a and 1-a 
are bigger than (1-d)/221 there is an equilibrium in which each user group adopts its preferred 
technology. Welfare possibilities depend on the balance of preferences in the population (a) and the 
strength of the match (d, which is bigger if users prefer their favourite technology more strongly) this 
‘diversity’ outcome is only efficient if d > 1 and it is the only equilibrium. 
Policy implications 
Taken together, the combination of switching costs and network effects bind users to suppliers of 
incompatible hardware/software/services combinations, locking in their initial choices. This keeps 
users from changing suppliers (or even finding out about alternatives) in response to predictable or 
unpredictable changes in price, quality and/or efficiency, giving suppliers lucrative ex post market 
power. This power is exercised over the original user in the switching cost (or brand loyalty) case and 
over other users in the case of network effects. In market-led scenarios, suppliers can be expected to 
compete ex ante for this power, by means of introductory pricing, gold-plated introductory offers 
(especially for subscriptions), bundling and periodic price wars. This competition for the market can 
adequately replace competition in the market among compatible services; it can even be stronger than 
compatible competition if it weakens product/service differentiation22. More often, however, 
competition among incompatible services leads to direct efficiency loss, softens like-for-like 
competition and enhances incumbent advantage. In the presence of network effects, established firms 
have little reason continually to improve services and/or commercial arrangements, especially when 
users and producers of complements base expectations and behaviour on factors unrelated to 
efficiency (such as installed base). As noted above, while competition between incompatible or 
disconnected networks is initially unstable and sensitive to competitive offers, new technologies and 
random shocks, after it tips23 into monopoly or oligopoly entry may be unlikely or even prevented by 
incompatibility24. By contrast, switching costs promise profits that encourage small-scale entry but 
discourage more aggressive raids on rivals’ customer bases even by modestly superior technologies. 
The combined result is that even inefficient competition for the market based on incompatibility is 
more profitable than compatible competition in the market, especially for incumbents or crossover 
entrants with strong a priori advantages from installed base, command of other services or IPR or 
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favourable expectations based on past financial performance, linkages to large stable (e.g. public-
sector) users and/or links to important stakeholders in other parts of the value chain25.  
There is some disagreement about whether this incompatible competition is desirable, largely arising 
from different expectations of adopter coordination in the presence of network effects. Those who 
expect competition for the market to perform well in static and dynamic senses assume that users will 
be able to implement coordinated shifts to better technologies or bundles via: bandwagon effects, 
communication (e.g. standards organisations), introductory pricing, etc. Such “good” coordination 
makes the market behave like a single adopter; competition among incompatible offers provides less 
variety but equally less product differentiation, resulting in sharper competition. In a dynamic setting, 
where users make their own investments in the adopted technology/standard, individual switching 
costs rise and interact with network effects to create large collective switching costs. However, such 
markets may not do badly, because adopters’ initial benefits counterbalance their eventual losses to 
dominant provider(s). 
Others expect coordination to fail or to “succeed” only by reinforcing aspects of technology related to 
external factors (e.g. installed base, prior relationships) rather than efficiency. This gives several 
reasons why competition for markets may fail. First, there is no a priori reason to expect ‘good’ 
differentiation instead of fragmentation (loss of network benefits) or locked-in convergence to the 
“wrong” technology, leading users collectively to ignore superior alternatives. In this world, offering 
better deals is not a safe strategy; suppliers will find other ways to capture the attention of users and 
suppliers of complements and will invest in other ways to generate profits from their captives. They 
will thus offer less efficient services on less attractive terms. If user and partner expectations are more 
responsive to e.g. installed base than actual performance (which may be harder to observe or more 
‘subjective’), the extra value delivered by network effects gets converted to collective switching costs, 
locking users into outdated or simply inferior technologies. Finally, high returns to locking in user and 
partner expectations encourage other inefficiencies such as exclusive dealing26 or ‘vapourware27’ 
preannouncements by incumbents aimed at blocking any ‘windows of opportunity’ for entry of 
efficient rivals. The scope for such predatory behaviour will only increase if the attention of the 
market is dominated by the offerings of powerful incumbents, because incumbent status is a more 
attractive prize. The retrains to incumbency increase and it is easier to recover costs spent fending off 
more efficient rivals. Whether entry by incompatible rival technologies is desirable on other grounds, 
barriers to gradual or small-scale entry raise competition concerns. For instance, merger or collusion 
among incumbents resulting in joint control of a technology cluster or standard may be worse than the 
same merger or collusion if it failed to deter compatible entry.  
It might be easier to tackle the combined impact of proprietary network effects and imperfect 
coordination, were it not for market dynamics. For example, recognising the possible anticompetitive 
use of preannouncements does not guide useful policy; ‘bad’ ones cannot be barred ex ante but ex post 
may be too late and in any case counterfactual evidence may be impossible to obtain. Conventional 
approaches to predatory pricing militate against below-cost pricing, but during the initial phase or to 
attract key adopters or ‘platform complements’ (e.g. providers of attractive content or applications to 
a platform), this is an essential part of competition among incompatible platforms. 
A more promising avenue may be to assist user/adopter communication or coordination, for example 
by means of information policies (monitoring, disclosure requirements and other ways to help users 
know what they are getting into), consumer protection policy to enforce promises made to adopters 
and other ways to overcome free-riding among users. 
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Gandal (2003) found a significant effect in DVDs and Fisher (1991) stressed the difficulty of crafting remedies. 
Recent hopeful developments include support for self-regulation, e.g. enhancing the role of 
standardisation bodies in focusing user expectations. Especially helpful can be guarantees of 
regulatory forbearance in relation to standards bodies. Recent cases in relation to e.g. their 
consideration of the costs of patent licensing having raised fears of prosecution, especially in view of 
the presence of ‘stealth patents’ that have been inadvertently (on the part of the standards bodies) been 
incorporated into public standards28.  
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